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I think you will agree that the title 
for this morning's talk is odd to say the 
least. You have studied, thought, talked 
about and listened to various facets of 
the problem of counterinsurgency-the 
political factors, the sociological, eco-
nomic, and even the military factors. 
But what on earth does law have to do 
with this subject? 
Some of you will have remembered 
your experience during the Interna-
tional Law Study earlier this year and 
perhaps have jumped to the conclusion 
that, without lawyers, the subject of 
counterinsurgency would be too clear-
it needs someone to muddy the waters, 
to cast doubt and confusion where 
understanding and clarity existed be-
fore. 
Let me illustrate. Take the definition 
of insurgency provided you last Wednes-
day from the Dictionary of [United 
States} Military Terms.! ''Insurgency-
A condition resulting from a revolt or 
insurrection against a constituted gov-
ernment which falls short of civil war. 
In the current context, subversive in-
surgency is primarily communist in-
spired, supported, or exploited. "Notice 
that we are supposed to be talking 
about a revolt or insurrection which 
falls short of civil war. What is a civil 
war, about which we are not to talk? A 
search of the same dictionary provides 
no definition of these two words. Do 
you suppose that the man on the street 
would describe that Mr. Castro engaged 
in in Cuba as a "civil war"? How about 
Ho Chi Minh's efforts-aren't they a 
civil war? Are North and South Vietnam 
two different countries, or different 
segments of the one country? Further, 
are there not sizable numbers of South 
Vietnamese fighting with the Viet Cong 
against the South Vietnamese govern-
ment forces? Are those not elements of 
a civil war? Could we not describe the 
Santo Domingo situation as a civil war? 
In short, doesn't the exclusion of civil 
war from consideration in the subject of 
"counterinsurgency" exclude much of 
the most important material to he con-
sidered? And, in any case, what reason 
could the authors of the. definition have 
had for drawing a distinction hetween 
an insurrection and a civil war? Isn't the 
problem one of subversive aggression or 
wars of liberation? And can't you have a 
war of liberation taking the form of a 
civil war just as well as some other 
form? 
There, you see, I told you that a 
lawyer and a legal analysis would make 
no positive contribution to your study 
of the suhject of counterinsurgency. 
Only a lawyer could he so distracted 
and fail to see the real problem. As with 
the case of Mike the hurglar who was 
caught red-handed and hailed into 
court, help from lawyers should be 
declined. When the judge asked Mike 
why he had refused to be defended by a 
lawyer, Mike said: "It's too late now-
the time when I needed a lawyer was 
when I was making my plans to rob the 
joint. If I had had a good lawyer then, 
you would never have caught me with 
the goods. " 
Now therein doth lie a moral. It is 
frequently forgotten that one of the 
most significant functions that a lawyer 
can perform is to counsel his client and 
advise him about the plans and conduct 
which his client intends for the future. 
Another important function is to serve 
as an advocate of his client's position-
to present the case in the best and most 
favorable light possible. 
If this morning's subject were to send 
us off in pursuit of abstract rules of 
international law, derived from treaties 
or customary law, in the fond hope that 
by adequate research of the precedents 
at the same time so plausible and so 
convincing that even Mr. Lin Piao or Ho 
Chi Minh would recognize the justice of 
our cause-then indeed, law has no 
useful function to perform in this area. 
If, however, we start looking for a 
consistent framework in which to couch 
our response to the concept and prac-
tice of wars of liberation, if we start 
looking for the most persuasive argu-
ments in which to dress our policies of 
counterinsurgency, if before taking 
counterinsurgency action we pause to 
consider the relative plausibility and 
persuasiveness of arguments in support 
which, after the act, it will be possible 
to make-then indeed, legal analysis 
may have a more useful function to 
perform in this area. 
But, you will be saying, if that is the 
function to be served by legal analysis as 
applied to counterinsurgency, how does 
legal analysis differ from psychological 
warfare? How indeed! Look again, at 
the military dictionary definition of 
"counterinsurgency." Law isn't men-
tioned, but psychological action is. To 
whom is that psychological action to be 
addressed? 
Part of my case to you this morning 
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is that the Russians and Chinese are 
attempting to make significant use of 
legal-type arguments for psychological 
purposes. These legal-type arguments 
are being addressed to a wide variety of 
audiences-first to their own citizens, 
then to the citizens of countries to be 
subjected to "wars of liberation," then 
to the citizens of uncommitted coun-
tries, and last but certainly not least, to 
our very own citizens. Within our own 
country there is considerable debate 
concerning the legality of our policies. 
The casual reader of The New York 
Times and other papers cannot fail to 
have noticed ,the significant emphasis to 
editorials as well as in full-page adver-
tisements of arguments addressed to the 
legality or illegality of our position in 
Vietnam. Arguments as to the legality 
or illegality of our actions in Santo 
Domingo have touched off a consider-
able debate in our own Senate. 
Provision of a legal framework for 
our policies of counterinsurgency has 
become, then, a serious task. We need to 
present our own policies as clearly, 
persuasively, and forcefully as possible 
to our own people. Lack of persuasive 
argument supporting our actions will 
only lead to detraction from our 
political and military effort within our 
own country. A fortior~ we need a 
persuasive legal framework in which to 
set our actions for the benefit of other 
states, and even for the. benefit of 
people behind the iron curtain. Psycho-
logical warfare is important, and I am 
suggesting to you, that the existence of 
a persuasive legal argument in support 
of our political and military actions is 
an important element in that psycho-
logical operation. 
Khrushchev, Che Guevara, and Lin 
Piao have not created a concept devoid 
of appeal and superficial justification in 
this plan of "people's war" or "wars of 
liberation." The concept is carefully 
calculated to appeal to the notion, 
historically so important to us, that the 
right of revolution belongs inherently to 
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every people against an unjust govern-
ment. Just look at the way in which the 
military dictionary attempts to dis-
tinguish between insurgency and subver-
sive insurgency_ We cannot, with any 
degree of plausibility, reject the concept 
of the freedom of a people to revolt. 
Immediately therefore, the concept of 
"war of liberation" puts us somewhat 
on the defensive. Revolution per se 
cannot be unlawful. What then, are the 
other identifiable element or elements 
which, when added to revolution, make 
it unlawful or subversive? 
We may be tempted to respond with 
the military dictionary-that element is 
"communist inspiration." But such 
"communist inspiration" may be hard 
to define, and even harder to prove and 
verify as a matter of factual report. 
Furthermore, to many peoples of the 
world, and perhaps to a number of our 
own people, freedom to choose a gov-
ernment, or the right of self-determina-
tion, may well involve the right of a 
people to choose if they wish, and that 
wish is democratically established, a 
government communist in form. For us 
simply to take a position, therefore, 
that all revolution is lawful, save only 
that which is communist inspired, may 
be a position substantially devoid of 
plausibility or persuasiveness, not only 
for world audiences but also for some of 
our own. Perhaps we must look further 
for those elements which, in addition to 
revolution, are to make such revolution 
into subversion or subversive aggression. 
If the world were free of lawyers, you 
may say, anyone could tell me that the 
distinctive factor making the revolution 
subversive is intervention from outside, 
the export of revolution by one country 
to another. Exported revolution is just 
one specific form of aggression. 
But is the problem quite that simple? 
What actions constitute the "export" of 
revolution? Consider for a moment a 
few among the possible wide range of 
activities which China, Russia, or Cuba 
might take in relation to a country ripe 
for revolution. First might COme a 
propaganda campaign-in the presses, 
over the radio, at diplomatic con-
ferences, perhaps in the United Nations. 
Perhaps part of this program, possibly 
separate and distinct from it, might be 
threats as to what action might be taken 
if the revolution is not allowed to 
blossom. Next might come the receiving 
and training of revolutionaries, nationals 
of the country involved. Is the training 
of "students" in Cuba "interventionary 
aggression" towards Venezuela? Next, 
might come the supplying of materiel to 
the revolutionary group, varying from 
literature and food to arms. Next might 
come the sending of a few "volunteers" 
to help organize and train the rebels-
next, permission to use Cuba as a haven 
for the indigenous rebel forces-and so 
on. Where, in this list of actions, does 
subversive aggression begin? 
Let us pause for a moment, and look 
briefly at the teachings of classical 
international law. Has a practice de-
veloped which can be appropriately 
used today as a yardstick in our battle 
with wars of liberation? 
The cornerstone of traditional inter-
national law is the concept of state 
sovereignty-that is to say that, for the 
most part, a state is entitled to manage 
its own affairs free from direction or 
intervention from outside states. This 
particular concept is enshrined in 
Article 2(7) of the United Nations 
Charter: "Nothing contained in the 
present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the domes-
tic jurisdiction of any state .... " At the 
very next level of abstraction, this prin-
ciple requires that each state and the 
people of that state be free to determine 
their own form of government, free 
from any such external interference. 
Said Professor Friedmann, one of the 
most prestigious writers on international 
law in this country, only last year: 
" ... any attempt by a foreign power to 
interfere with internal change, either by 
assisting rebels to overthrow the legiti-
mate government, or by helping the 
incumbent government to suppress a 
rcvolution is contrary to international 
law."2 Now I want you to note this 
statement carefully. First, it makes clear 
what the consensus of writing for centu-
ries has made clear-that for an outside 
state to lend assistance to a group of 
rebels is to interfere illegally in the 
internal affairs of the state in revolt. 
Second, it makes assistance to the gov-
ernment in power resisting such revolt 
equally as illegal as interference or 
intervention. Third, what is proscribed 
is "interference with internal change," a 
phrase pregnant with triplets of am-
biguity. What this particular quotation 
does not say is that while states and 
state departments for centuries have 
been uttering these propositions, many 
of the same states have, with some 
degree of regularity, been conducting 
their practice against very different cri-
teria. The authors of the Holy Alliance 
in 1815, the Emperors of Russia, 
Austria, and the King of Prussia, essayed 
a somewhat more practical statement of 
policy by claiming the right to interfere 
in the internal affairs of any country 
threatened by revolution against the 
legitimate sovereign. You will recall that 
the Monroe Doctrine was formulated as 
a response to that policy. 
Now let me illustrate what some of 
our own American authors are currently 
doing with this material. Says the same 
Professor Friedmann in another recent 
article: 
Since many of the internal con-
flicts, such as the internal dis-
orders in Cyprus or the Congo, 
have international implications 
and may lead to the intervention 
of antagonistic powers on dif-
ferent sides of the conflict, non-
intervention on the part of out-
side powers is the most desirable 
international policy which should, 
as far as possible, be ensured by 
nonintervention agreements be-
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tween those concerned. The role 
of the United Nations in these 
conflicts will essentially be that of 
a neutral forum for mediation. In 
case of major intervention by out-
side powers, the U.N. may have to 
be called in to keep the opposing 
in terven tionists at arm's 
length .... 3 
Says Professor Falk of Princeton Univer-
sity: 
... internal war rages in South 
Vietnam, initiated by a series of 
rather clandestine North Vietna-
mese guerrilla interventions and 
countered by strident American 
military intervention in apparent 
violation of the 1954 Geneva 
Accords. Interventionary policy 
accounts for the most intense 
forms of violent conflict present 
in the world today. 
The point is not to condemn these 
interventions, but to suggest that a 
foreign policy that depends upon 
unilateral military interventions 
by one nation in the affairs of 
another usually violates clear 
norms of international law .... 
The willingness of the United 
States to adopt illegal interven-
tionary tactics, under the pressure 
of the cold war, jeopardizes our 
moral commitment to a foreign 
policy of law-abidance, a commit-
ment abstractly reiterated by our 
statesmen from many rostrums.4 
Instead, he suggests this solution: 
But international peace is not 
only threatened by internal war-
fare. Peace is also endangered by 
certain repressive social policies 
which, if allowed to remain 
unaltered, will produce serious 
outbreaks of domestic violence. 
This prospect prompts the central 
contention of this essay-that the 
United Nations should be au-
thorized on a selective basis to 
coerce domestic social changes. 
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This authorization is what we 
refer to throughout as legislative 
intervention.5 
It is interesting that, according to his 
argument, what would be prohibited 
intervention by one state becomes legal 
when done in the name of the United 
Nations. 
The reason for giving you these 
lengthy quotations is this: With respect, 
I suggest that these scholars are striving 
for some "neutral" principles by which 
the affairs of the world can, in the 
future, be peacefully regulated. The 
search for such scholarly principles may 
be important, but it fails substantially as 
an exercise - in psychological warfare, 
just as it apparently fails in an estimate 
of political motivation in the world 
today. 
But notice how this search for neu-
tral principles can distract attention 
from a point of cardinal importance._ If 
intervention in internal affairs of a state 
is illegal, what facts must be established 
to constitute proof of such intervention, 
and what remedies are available once a 
case of such intervention has been estab-
lished? Given a clear plan of action for 
wars of liberation as .described by Lin 
Piao, surely the obvious psychological 
counter, and surely a point of scholarly 
concern, focuses on development of 
criteria or standards for measuring ex-
ternal meddling, and on remedies for 
violation of those standards.6 And I 
may say that the search for a remedy 
that does not at the same time kill the 
patient, is a task of monumental propor-
tions. 
Let me say again, however, that it is 
important that such criteria be de-
veloped and argued, not in the belief 
that Lin Piao will be convinced and will 
change his mind, but rather as neces-
saries to answer foreign propaganda, or 
for that matter, for our own domestic 
consumption. Given the threat as de-
fined by Khrushchev, Guevara, and Lin 
Piao, I would also suggest that our 
psychological response must involve the 
reworking of the classic statement made 
by Friedmann. We cannot afford en-
dorsing a policy which may preclude 
assistance to a government in power in 
an effort to combat incipient stages of 
subversion. At the same time, the state-
ment of criteria for such assistance again 
involves a monumental problem-to give 
such support for the purpose of 
countering subversion may at the same 
time have the effect of impeding a truly 
indigenous movement for social reform. 
If some of our writers have been 
more concerned with standards for a 
law-abiding world than with developing 
a psychological response to the concept 
of people's war and wars of liberation, 
what have the Russians been doing? In a 
text on international law written in 
Moscow and obligingly translated by the' 
Russians into English and distributed 
here in 1962, is to be found a discussion 
of the so-called Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence. The Principles represent 
the latest Russian use of legal analysis 
for psychological purposes. You may, 
for instance, be surprised to learn that: 
Important principles of Interna-
tional Law such as the sovereign 
equality of States, the self-
determination of nations, non-
interference in the internal affairs 
of other countries, territorial in-
tegrity, peaceful coexistence and 
cooperation between States re-
gardless of their social systems 
and the conscientious observance 
of obligations assumed became 
the guiding principles of the 
world's first socialist State in its 
international relations.7 
You may also be surprised at the follow-
ing expansion on this theme: 
The recognition of each people's 
right to be master in its own 
country-that is, its unconditional 
right itself to decide its own social 
and political system and to deter-
mine its internal and foreign 
policy without any interference 
whatsoever by other States-offers 
wide opportunities for fruitful 
peaceful and mutually advan-
tageous cooperation between 
States, regardless of differences in 
their social systems. In this lies 
the importance of the principle of 
nonintervention in the present-
day world.8 
Professor Lipson of Yale has offered an 
especially shrewd evaluation of the 
psychological use by the Russians of 
these concepts of peaceful coexistence. 9 
He suggests that they are skillfully 
blended to appeal first to the nationalis.t 
aspirations of colonial and under-
developed countries to make their own 
way free, not only politically, but also 
economically. Next they are designed to 
appeal to audiences in the United States 
and other western countries who would 
like to see a lessening of tension, accom-
panied probably by disarmament or 
reduction in military effort. Again, they 
appeal to the Russian audience because 
of the ideological split with China. 
Thcse are words of peaceful competi-
tion with the West, rather than head-
strong willful risk of nuclear war. In 
short, the Principles of Peaceful Co-
existence are a masterful concoction of 
psychological warfare. But notice the 
gap between the promise and the fact. 
Again, our counter seems to lie in 
formulating the extent of that gap and 
giving it factual documentation. 
Of course, the authors of this 
Russian text could not foresee that 
Lin Piao would get a little out of 
step in his speech, "Long Live the 
Victory of the People's War." Says 
he: 
In the final analysis, the whole 
cause of world revolution hinges 
on the revolutionary struggles of 
the Asian, African, and Latin 
American peoples who make up 
the overwhelming majority of the 
world's population. The socialist 
countries should regard it as their 
internationalist duty to support 
the people's revolutionary 
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struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America. 1 0 
None of this, I take it, is intended to 
amount to interference in the internal 
affairs of another state. 
But enough of these relative abstrac-
tions. Let us come down to a couple of 
specific illustrations of the importance 
of legal argument in support of our 
political and military decisions and 
actions. Let us see something of the use 
to which argumentation, hoth foreign 
and domestic, puts legal-style analysis 
and something of the kind of response 
which is required of us. In the mail the 
other day, I received an "Appeal to the 
Lawyers of the World" from the Inter-
national Association of Democratic 
Lawyers, whose headquarters is in Brus-
sels. This constitutes: 
... a solemn appeal to our col-
leagues in the whole world urging 
them to condemn the numerous 
and grave violations on interna-
tional law hy the war waged 
against the Vietnamese people by 
American imperialism. 
(I) International law is violated 
hy the systematic intervention of 
the U.S.A. in the international 
affairs of South Vietnam; hy the 
installation of governments of 
their choice, that are neither en-
joying the confidence of the 
people, nor being appointed 
democratically, in contravention 
of point 12 of the final declara-
tion of the Geneva Conference 
held in 1954 which was solemnly 
agreed to by the representative of 
the United States, Mr. Bedell 
Smith, in the name of his govern-
ment. 
(2) International law is violated 
by the military aggression 
launched by the United States 
against Vietnam; by the landing in 
South Vietnam of foreign troops 
that include U.S. nationals and 
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units from S.E.A.T.O. or 
A.N.Z.U.S. countries, committing 
acts of war also against the Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam, 
equally in contravention of point 
12 already mentioned. 
(3) International law is violated 
when in the course of this aggres-
sive war the United States is de-
stroying schools, libraries, pa-
godas, churches and hospitals 
under the false pretext of pur-
suing military aims; when the 
American troops are making use 
of horrible and prohibited 
weapons such as noxious gases, 
napalm, yellow phosphorous 
bombs, dumdum bullets. All these 
inhuman methods were banned by 
the Hague Conventions of 1899 
and by other international norms, 
e.g., the Versailles Treaty of 28 
June 1919 (art. 171), or the 
Geneva Agreement of 17 July 
1925. 
(4) International law is violated 
when prisoners are submitted to 
humiliating and degrading treat-
ment by the American troops, or 
are savagely killed without judg-
ment nor the legal guarantees 
recognized as obligatory by all 
civilized nations as well as by art. 
3 of the Geneva Agreement of 12 
August 1949; or when the same 
American troops massacre the 
civil population and submit them 
to barbarous tortures. 11 
And so on-the hand behind the pen is 
clear. 
Now, you are probably saying, that is 
a concoction of lies to which our 
response should be simply that-
answering such a document involves no 
exercise in legal analysis and applied 
psychology. To a considerable extent 
you would be correct. But notice the 
subtlety with which some of the issues 
are woven in. Let us just take as an 
example, the first paragraph I read you. 
That we have a large army in Vietnam is 
clear, and that the presence of such an 
army has a substantial effect on the 
internal affairs of Vietnam is equally 
clear. Is this "intervention"? Well, you 
say, our response rests on the fact that 
we were requested to help hy the 
Vietnamese government. But then 
notice that the same paragraph suggests 
that our host or inviting government is 
in fact our own puppet, which has not 
been "democratically appointed" in ac-
cordance with the Geneva Accord of 
1954. You suspect that the Ky regime 
was, in fact, not appointed by a 51 
percent or better majority of every 
adult entitled and willing to vote in 
South Vietnam. So to counter this, you 
begin an argument that, in an under-
developed and undereducated country 
or community, full-flowered democracy 
is a factual impossibility. Besides, you 
say, look at Ho Chi Minh. Now this 
second argument is interesting. With the 
audiences to which this material is 
presented, the argument that the other 
side is doing the same bad things, is 
peculiarly unpersuasive. The first argu-
ment is the one whieh needs to be 
presented, but notice the technique. 
The charges are so framed, that an 
accurate response becomes so detailed, 
intricate, and tied in with-legal argumen-
tation that the audience may be lost in 
the middle of the answer. 
The aim of this material is to con-
fuse. And the answer or psychological 
counter is not a point by point refuta-
tion of their thesis-rather, it should or 
even must be found in a coherent 
policy. We should be in a position to 
explain what that policy is-that it has a 
measure of objectivity-that is to say 
that it is not an action adopted ad hoc, 
but is the application of principles 
established as such and consistently 
advocated and followed by us in. our 
foreign relations. Such a policy requires 
focusing on the concept of "war of 
liberation," upon the fact of external 
interference with the political balance in 
South Vietnam by Ho Chi Minh and the 
Chinese-this involves the development 
of criteria, mentioned earlier, against 
which we can judge and establish such 
interference, and it requires the develop-
ment and advocacy of remedies to be 
taken in the face of such interference 
violative of our proclaimed standards. 
Law is the antithesis of arbitrary action 
-and legal analysis and argumentation, 
to be persuasive, must be founded in 
consistency of principle and, as far as 
possible, in application of such princi-
ple. 
Now, you are probably saying, who 
needs to respond to a position like that 
of the International Association of 
Democratic Lawyers? It is, and this 
must be patent to the reader, a tissue of 
lies. First, you are on notice that the 
Russians are a eareful, calculating group, 
who do not do many things without 
apparent object. They think this kind of 
propaganda is worthwhile-be careful of 
underestimating their judgment. Re-
member the message of this counter-
insurgency program-that the battle is 
one for people, and the people of that 
phrase are being exposed to this kind of 
argumentation. That it needs answering 
in foreign audiences can best be illus-
trated by referring to the extent to 
which some of the arguments therein 
advanced have received a measure of 
support and sympathy within our very 
own country. Let me read to you a 
short passage from a speech delivered on 
September 23,1965: 
In Vietnam, we have totally 
flouted the rule of law, and we 
have flouted the United Nations 
Charter. This lip service given by 
the United States to the United 
Nations and its international law 
provisions and procedures has 
done our country great injury 
among many international lawyers 
around the world. Our waging an 
undeclared war in southeast Asia 
in flagrant violation of our oft-
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expressed pretense that the 
United States stands for the sub-
stitution of the rule of law for the 
jungle law of the military claw in 
meeting threats to the peace of 
the world, has done great damage 
to our reputation for reliability in 
international affairs. Our good 
reputation in world affairs previ-
ously held by millions of people 
in the underdeveloped areas of the 
world has been tarnished by our 
unjustified warmaking in south-
east Asia.1 2 
These are words of the Honorable 
Wayne Morse spoken on the floor of our 
Senate. It seems we have something of a 
missionary job to do in our own coun-
try! 
Now, for a second illustration of the 
importance of legal analysis, let us'look 
at another recent counterinsurgency 
situation-the Dominican Republic. 
Remember that the thesis is this: Our 
political and military actions need to be 
explained by an argument of their 
legality presented as persuasively as pos-
sible. 
What we had, obviously, in the 
Dominican Republic, was an incipient 
political revolution. I take it that there 
was and is little doubt that substantial 
numbers of citizens of the Dominican 
Republic were so dissatisfied with their 
existing government that they proposed 
to resort to revolution as an answer. Our 
problem was equally obvious. The exist-
ence of a fighting civil war provides an 
excellent opportunity for communist 
trained, and perhaps even exported, 
leaders to penetrate and then take over 
one of the forces in the revolution. The 
communist handbook is simple and 
direct in ordering party members to 
capitalize, however and whenever pos-
sible, on issues that are politically 
divisive. Their ability to so capitalize 
can be illustrated all the way from 
Cuba, even to perhaps some of our 
university campuses. But, and this is 
important, we were not in a position to 
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deny that there was an indigenous revo-
lution-that people of the Republic 
were asserting their freedom, as a last 
resort, to revolt against what they con-
sidered to be an unfair and unrepresen-
tative government What then, could we 
make by way of legal argument to 
explain that our intervention was not 
inconsistent with or destructive of this 
inherent right of revolution, while still 
taking steps of military intervention 
deemed by our government necessary to 
prevent communist subversion of this 
indigenous revolution? Said Mr. Meeker, 
the Legal Adviser to the State Depart-
ment: 
We landed troops in the Domini-
can Republic in order to preserve 
the lives of foreign nationals-
nationals of the United States and 
many other countries. We con-
tinued our military presence in 
the Dominican Republic for the 
additional purpose of preserving 
the capacity of the OAS to func-
tion in the manner intended by 
the OAS Charter-to achieve 
peace and justice through securing 
a cease-fire and through reestab-
lishing orderly political processes 
within which Dominicans could 
choose their own government, 
free from outside interference.13 
Now this statement of our position is 
not without its difficulties, in terms of 
psychological persuasion. Notice first, 
its apparent inconsistency with the con-
cept of ultimate freedom of revolt. This 
appears to say that if you revolt, we 
reserve the right to step in and prevent 
the fighting so that a new government 
may be chosen democratically, i.e., by 
supervised voting, after debate and dis-
cussion of the problem and the pro-
posed party platforms. This indeed, is 
the advocacy of a principle considerably 
adapted from that of the ultimate free-
dom to revolt. Notice also, that any 
such "police" intervention may have a 
significant effect on the relative strength 
in any subsequent election of the 
government previously in power and the 
rebel group. 
The cornerstone of our political and 
military decision is clear. We are all too 
well acquainted with the communist 
pattern of infiltration and subversion, 
and for our purposes, it does not much 
matter whether that infiltration is ef-
fected by Dominicans or by communist 
operatives brought in from other coun-
tries. The thing that counts in the end is 
simply this: Does the government ulti-
mately achieving power answer directly 
to communist centers? Is it subservient 
to communist control, and will it take 
communist steps to prevent any future 
unfortunate revolt or attempt a demo-
cratic selection of government? In short, 
will the establishment of such govern-
ment preclude for the future a free 
demonstration of political choice by the 
people of the country? 
The selection of a cornerstone of 
legal analysis, of the most persuasive 
argument in explanation of this policy, 
is much more complex. Our statement 
and repetition of patterns of communist 
behavior fails to persuade many of our 
own citizens, let alone many Latin 
American audiences. Moscow says they 
did not have anything to do with a 
take-over of any revolution, and we, as 
the active intervening parties, are sud-
denly cast with the burden of proof to 
establish as the price of legalizing our 
position, that, in fact, the revolution 
was being substantially affected or con-
trolled by infiltrated communist opera-
tives. That is no mean burden of proof. 
On the other hand, if (and I am not 
necessarily saying we should), we 
adopted the following proposition as 
our neutral principle or policy, we could 
avoid the foregoing burden of proof 
problem. That principle might be: Wher-
ever possible, widespread civil war and 
bloodshed should be forestalled by in-
tervention of a police force designed to 
keep the peace while at the same time 
laying a basis for future democratically 
organized and supervised elections. We 
could then rely simply on the outhreak 
of suhstantial civil war and widespread 
hloodshed and hreakdown of the essen-
tial processes of government For such a 
principle to he effective, however, we 
have to he in a position to argue that 
this is not a policy conceived on the 
spur of the moment to take care of this 
specific incident-in short, that it is a 
policy we plan on adhering to con-
sistently. And if this policy were to he 
selected as such principle, it must he 
capahle of withstanding analysis and 
criticism. 
Without looking up any official docu-
ment on statement, I could give you the 
gist of a Russian response. But, in this 
instance, that is unnecessary since we 
have vocal criticism of the policy in the 
Dominican Repuhlic right here at home. 
Our policies or principles are heing put 
to the test of analysis and criticism right 
here, as well as hefore foreign audiences. 
Senator Fulhright has said of our 
actions there: 
The prospect of an election in 
nine months, which may conceiv-
ahly produce a strong democratic 
government, is certainly reassuring 
on this score, hut the [fact] re-
mains that the reaction of the 
United States at the time of acute 
crisis was to intervene forcibly 
and illegally against a revolution, 
which, had we sought to influence 
it instead of suppressing it, might 
have produced a strong popular 
government without foreign mili-
tary intervention. 
Since just ahout every revolu-
tionary movement is likely to 
attract Communist support, at 
least in the heginning, the ap-
proach followed in the Dominican 
Repuhlic, if consistently pursued, 
must inevitahly make us the 
enemy of all revolutions and 
therefore the ally of all the un-
popular and corrupt oligarchies of 
the hemisphere.! 4 
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In contrast, Under Secretary of State 
Mann has said: 
When in other words, a Commu-
nist state has intervened in the 
internal affairs of an American 
state hy training, directing, fi-
nancing, and organizing indige-
nous Communist elements to take 
control of the government of an 
American state hy force and vio-
lence, should other American 
states he powerless to lend assis-
tance? Are Communists free to 
intervene while democratic states 
are powerless to frustrate that 
intervention?! 5 
From the point of view of legal 
analysis and persuasive argument, hoth 
these statements are interesting. The 
Senator's statement hrands our action as 
"illegal," without amplification. That 
such amplification could he provided is 
clear. The introduction of our army into 
the country of another state calls for 
the clearest of supporting arguments to 
escape the charge of illegality. And the 
fact that a political faction in the 
Dominican Repuhlic decided to invite 
us adds a little, hut not very much in 
the circumstances, to our position. On 
the other hand, Secretary Mann's analy-
sis assumes that communist "indoctrina-
tion" of certain political rehels, who 
might very well have heen natives of the 
Repuhlic, constituted intervention 
which, impliedly, authorized us to take 
a counterremedy in the form of an 
armed landing. Perhaps, in the long run, 
the most persuasive argument runs along 
lines suggested hy Mr. Mann, rather than 
along lines of a principle of preventing 
hloodshed and facilitating free elections. 
Suffice it to say that we need a 
coherent and consistent policy. Senator 
Fulhright underlines the importance of 
such a policy consistently applied when 
he says that potential revolutionaries in 
Latin America may regard our action in 
the Dominican Repuhlic as an explicit 
declaration of our position in favor of 
status quo government, no matter how 
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bad it may be, and against revolution. 
And so, we come back full circle to the 
problem: how to formulate a policy to 
best support our political and military 
decisions taken in the context of coun-
terinsurgency-how to distinguish in 
that policy between freedom of revolu-
tion and proscription of wars of libera-
tion and people's war. 
That problem is reported to be under 
consideration in our discussions with 
Latin American countries, as late as last 
Thursday. The New York Times of that 
day! 6 carries a story of Mexican views 
on a proposal for collective Latin 
American action in the event of com-
plete breakdown of order and authority 
in one of the OAS states. 
Fortunately, this morning, I have the 
luxury of criticizing the statements and 
writings of others, without any accom-
panying responsibility for defining 
policy goals in this area. There are, 
however, several factors which will, in 
my opinion, continue to affect the 
search for most effective policies and 
legal analyses to counter the threats 
posed by wars of liberation. 
First, the persuasiveness of any legal 
analysis is important to our domestic 
population. The ability to offer a clear 
and consistent purpose, rationale, and 
demonstration of its application to any 
current fact situation will have signifi-
cant impact on the domestic support 
which political and military decisions 
receive from our own population. For 
this reason, such purposes and policies 
must be consistent with our domestic 
governmental ethic. That ethic clearly 
believes in a right of revolution, and in 
the right of a people to choose their 
own form of government. This means 
freedom from communist subversion, 
but it also means freedom from United 
States support of unpopular and dicta-
torial regimes. Our counterinsurgency 
policy deals with stability of govern-
ments, but it must be so framed as to 
distinguish, as far as is possible, between 
indigenous revolution and communist 
subversion. Not every act of subversion 
can be allowed to taint a revolutionary 
group and we must refine a policy 
tailored to identify and brand those 
aspects of wars of liberation which seek 
to climb on the back of an indigneous 
movement. 
Second, to be as persuasive as pos-
sible, our policy must seek to share 
counterinsurgency responsibility, as far 
and as widely as possible. By way of 
illustration, the function of a lawyer in 
the Department of State would have 
been fantastically easier if the force 
which went into the Dominican Repub-
lic had been an OAS force, sent there 
pursuant to a resolution of that organi-
zation, and in implementation of a 
stable and consistent policy against in-
surgency formulated by that organiza-
tion. Such a sharing of responsibility 
requires that our policy be consistent 
then, not only with our own domestic 
ethic, but consistent, as far as is pos-
sible, with corresponding ethics outside 
the communist countries. We must 
recognize that in these other countries, 
which in many cases are backward and 
underdeveloped, revolution continues to 
play an important function in change 
and reform of government. Our policy 
cannot condemn revolution as such, 
even when accompanied by bloodshed, 
nor can it condemn revolution merely 
on the grounds that communist groups 
have joined in with it. 
Third, that policy must bring sharply 
into focus not only the problem of 
identifying what constitutes illegal inter-
vention through communist subversion, 
but also the ingredients of appropriate 
remedies for any such violation of the 
established policy. 
Fourth, we must recognize that con-
sistent application of this policy is 
important, and that departures from it, 
to meet the stresses of ad hoc situations 
of the moment, may be very costly in 
the long-run effectiveness of the psycho-
logical purpose. 
Fifth, we must continue to recognize 
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that such a policy does serve a psycholog-
ical purpose of importance hoth with our 
own people and ahroad. But the ohject of 
having the policy is not to seek ahstract 
standards to govern in a perfect law-abid-
ing world, hut rather to meet the practi-
cal day-to-day threats posed, and to he 
posed, hy wars ofliheration. 
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